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Abstract 
We study the allocation of time across decision problems. If a decision-maker 
(1) has noisy estimates of value, (2) improves those estimates the longer he or 
she  analyzes  a  choice  problem,  and  (3)  allocates  time  optimally,  then t h e  
decision-maker should spend less time choosing when the difference in value 
between two options is relatively large. To test this prediction we ask subjects 
to  make  27  binary  incentive-compatible  intertemporal  choices,  and  measure 
response time for each decision. Our time allocation model explains 54% of the 
variance in average decision time. These results support the view that decision-
making  is  a  cognitively  costly  activity  that  uses  time  as  an  input  allocated 
according to cost-benefit principles.  
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Agents should allocate time according to cost-benefit tradeoffs. Such 
tradeoffs  should  also  influence  the  amount  of  time  that  agents  allocate  to 
decision-making itself. It is natural to assume that agents have expected utility 
estimates  that  are  noisy  and  that  these  noisy  estimates  can  be  improved  by 
thinking longer about a choice problem. In this case, agents should allocate 
more decision time to choices between options of similar expected utility than 
to choices between options of dissimilar expected utility.  
Intuitively, if an agent’s estimate of the value of the best option is close 
to her estimate of the next best alternative, then it is optimal to take more time 
to refine her estimates since this extra time has a good chance of leading her to 
change her choice. In contrast, if an agent has a noisy estimate of the value of 
an option but the option almost surely dominates its alternatives, then it is not 
worth taking the time to refine her estimates, because additional thinking is 
unlikely to change her choice. These intuitions generalize, predicting an inverse 
relationship between average decision time and the difference in expected value 
between rewards in a binary choice set (Gabaix and Laibson, 2005; Gabaix et 
al., 2006). The current paper tests these predictions.  
Psychologists  have  studied  the  amount  of  time  that  subjects  take  to 
make comparative judgments since the work of Henmon (1906). In perception, 
Johnson  (1939)  had  subjects  decide  which  of  two  simultaneously  presented 
lines  was  longer,  and  found  that  response  time  (RT)  was  longer  the  more 
similar the lines: RT was a negative linear function of the logarithm of the 
difference  in  length.  This  pattern  has  been  found  with  other  perceptual 
quantities like area and luminance, with the size of visualized objects, and even 
with the magnitudes of abstract numbers (Moyer and Landauer, 1967). Brain 
imaging studies suggest that all of these comparison tasks invoke a common 
cognitive process localized in the parietal lobes (e.g., Pinel et al., 2004). 
In the experiments reported in the current paper, we find that response 
times are longer the more similar the discounted values of the rewards in a 
binary choice set. We ask laboratory subjects to make 27 binary intertemporal 
choices. We measure intertemporal preferences using data from these choices. 
We find that the average RT for each of the choices is predicted by the implied 
difference  in  discounted  expected  value.  Choices  with  relatively  large 
differences  in  discounted  value  have  low  average  RTs.  Differences  in 
discounted value account for 54.1% of the variance in average RT. When we 
estimate different discount rates for different reward size categories, differences 
in discounted value account for 69.9% of the RT variance. 
 
2. Data description 
We created a computerized version of a 27-question discounting task 
developed by Kirby et al. (1999). Each question asks the subject to choose 
between  a  smaller,  immediate  reward  (SIR)  and  a  larger,  delayed  reward (LDR), both denominated in U.S. dollars. For example, the first question asks 
“Would you prefer $54 today, or $55 in 117 days?” Rewards range from $11 
(the smallest SIR) to $85 (the largest LDR). Delays range from 7 to 186 days. 
Nine  trials  involve  “small”  LDRs  ($25–35),  nine  involve  “medium”  LDRs 
($50–60),  and  nine  involve  “large”  LDRs  ($75–85).  Following  Kirby  et  al. 
(1999),  we  refer  to  these  sets  of  nine  trials  as  reward  size  categories.  We 
administered the questions as described by Kirby et al. (1999), except that we 
also recorded the time that each subject took to answer each question (with a 
keypress), starting from the time it was displayed on the screen. 
This task was included in three separate studies that yielded data from a 
total  of  712  subjects:  (1)  The  Weight s t u d y  examined a s s o c i a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
body mass index (BMI) and discounting, as well as other measures of reward-
related behavior. (2) The Cognition study examined individual differences in 
cognitive  abilities,  decision-making,  and  personality.  (3)  The  Web s t u d y  
examined differences in cognition and personality that may be associated with 
differences in academic disciplines and career choices.
1 
In all three studies, each subject had a 1-in-6 chance of having one 
randomly-selected  question  played  out  for  real  stakes.  In  the  Weight  and 
Cognition studies, the subject rolled a six-sided die at the end of the testing 
session. If a 6 was rolled, the subject blindly drew from a box containing cards 
labeled  1–27,  corresponding t o  t h e  2 7  t r i a l s o f  t h e  d i s c o u n t i n g  t a s k .  I f  t h e  
subject chose the SIR on the randomly-drawn trial, the amount of the SIR was 
added to the subject’s show-up fee for participating, and a check request for the 
total was submitted to the research administration office within one business 
day. If the subject chose the LDR, a separate check request for the LDR amount 
was made after the specified delay. In the Web study, a spreadsheet was used to 
generate  the  necessary  random  numbers,  and  “winning”  subjects  received 
payment through an Amazon.com gift certificate, which was e-mailed by the 
next business day (SIRs) or after the specified delay (LDRs). 
In  the  Weight  and  Cognition  studies,  subjects  were  tested  in  the 
laboratory; for the Web study, they completed the task independently via the 
internet using their own computers.
2 Because the studies varied in recruitment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In total 751 subjects were tested, but 18 subjects were excluded from the Weight study and 16 
were excluded from the Cognition study for the following reasons: reported brain injury; reported 
mental illness; reported drug use; had difficulty understanding directions; was unable to complete 
the protocol; was previously tested. Five subjects from the Web study were excluded because 
they had three or more responses under 200 milliseconds on the discounting task. The average 
ages of remaining participants in the Weight, Cognition, and Web studies were, respectively, 32, 
27, and 31 years; the average numbers of years of education were 15.0, 14.3, and 18.4; the 
percentages of female participants were 50%, 52%, and 67%. !
"!Complete details of the study procedures, including software used, can be found in Chabris et 
al. (2008a). Examination of the data suggested that response time was measured with similar 
accuracy in all three studies.!strategies, participant characteristics, payment methods, and apparatus used to 
measure response time, we analyze them separately in this paper. 
 
3. Models and estimation techniques 
3.1. Discount function 
We  use  a  generalized  hyperbola  to  model  time  preferences  (Mazur 
1987). The discounted value of a one unit reward delayed by  days is  
. 
The discount rate—the rate of decline of the discount function—is decreasing 
with  . To simplify notation, we refer to parameter ! as the “discount rate,” 
though it is actually the instantaneous discount rate at horizon " = 0. 
 
3.2. Choice data model 
We assume that time preferences are homogeneous within each of our 
three datasets. A subject chooses delayed reward Y in " days over an immediate 
reward X if and only if the net present value of Y exceeds X: 
 
We  assume  that  subjects e x p e r i e n c e  preference  shocks  with t h e  l o g i s t i c  
distribution, so subjects choose the delayed reward with probability 
#! (1)!
where   i s  t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  l o g i s t i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The  parameters, 
and , are estimated in each dataset by maximizing the likelihood function 
! (2)!
Where  is  the  number  of  trials,  is  the  number  of  subjects,  and 
is  the  set  of  the  binary  decisions  made  by  the 
subjects. In trial  , dummy variable   if subject  chose the delayed 
reward   in "  days over the immediate reward   (otherwise  ). 
 
3.3. Response time model 
  Gabaix  and  Laibson  (2005)  and  Gabaix  et  al.  (2006)  predict  that 
decisions  should t a k e  the  longest  when  the  two  options  are  similar  in 
(discounted) value. Formally, subjects should take the most time on the trials 
for which the difference in the discounted values of the choices,! !#! (3)!
is closest to 0. The proxy for decision difficulty, , that we use is 
given by the transformation! !
$! (4)!
This transformation has three desirable properties. First,  is convex 
and  decreasing, w h i c h  m e a n s  t h a t  a s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  
values of the options grows larger,  exhibits less sensitivity to changes in  . 
Second,  this  transformation  is  based  on  the  logit  distribution  function ( 1 ) ;  
another  interpretation  of  is  that  subjects  take  longest  to  decide  when  the 
probability  of  choosing  one  or  the  other  reward  is  close  to  #.  Third,  the 
precision parameter  incorporates the effect of the variance of taste shocks on 
response  time—greater  variance  in  taste  shocks  corresponds  to  a  smaller 
precision parameter , which corresponds to larger response times.  
The response time (RT) model is!
! (5)!
where   is trial number,  is the response time of subject   on trial  , and 
is  the  subject  and  trial  specific  noise  term ( s e c t i o n  4 . 1  m o t i v a t e s  t h e  
term). We make no assumptions about the errors except that the random 
vectors  are mutually independent. Our approach to estimating 
the model is simply to minimize the sum of squared residuals; in other words, 
we seek the vector  that minimizes!
#! (6)!
where  
 
Note that  and  are taken from the revealed preference estimates obtained 
from (2). However, in some cases (see subsection 4.3) we estimate the 
complete vector in the response time model (i.e., we use the RT 
data to estimate the preference parameters directly). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Using choice data to estimate discount rates 
Table 1 reports estimates   obtained by using choice data to estimate 
the discount function. Specifically, we maximize the choice-based likelihood function  in  equation  (2)  for  each  of  our  three  studies.  We  also  estimate 
separately  the  discount  rates  for  each  of  the  three  different  reward  size 
categories. Consistent with others (e.g., Kirby et al., 1999; Jaroni et al., 2004) 
we find that subjects’ discount rates decrease with reward size. Moreover, we 
find that subjects in the Weight study have higher discount rates than subjects 
in the Cognition study, and that subjects in the Cognition study have slightly 
higher discount rates than subjects in the Web study. This is probably at least 
partially due to demographic differences between the samples.
3 
 
4.2 Using discount rates (estimated from choice data) to predict response 
time 
We use the discount rate estimates from choice data to predict response 
times. Specifically, for each study we use the estimated parameters   and  to 
define  as in equation (3), apply  as in equation (4) to get our proxy for 
decision difficulty,  , and then show that   predicts response times. 
We also control for the effect of experience—as subjects practice the 
choice task, they answer questions more quickly. Subjects take a substantial 
amount of time on the first two trials and thereafter the effect of experience is 
linear. Therefore, we drop the first two trials from the RT analysis and control 
for the linear learning effect in the remaining 25 trials. Finally, we trim our 
dataset by removing observations with extremely high RTs—we demean RTs at 
the subject level and drop observations that are in the top 2% of the distribution 
of demeaned RTs.
4 We apply these exclusions to all subsequent analyses. 
The columns labeled choice data in Tables 2 and 3 report the estimated 
discounting parameters when the model is estimated with choice data that are 
taken  from  the  trimmed  sample.
5 W e  f o r m  t h e  d e c i s i o n  d i f f i c u l t y  m e a s u r e ,  
,  using  these  parameters.  To  test  our  hypothesis  that   p r e d i c t s  
response time, we estimate the linear regression model 
$!
The  effect  of  is  highly  significant  (p <  0 . 0 0 1 )  a n d  p o s i t i v e  i n  t h e  
regression.  Figure  1  shows,  for  each  of  the  three d a t a s e t s ,  a  p l o t  o f  
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3 For example, the Weight study recruited subjects with high BMI and the Web study recruited 
college graduates. The differences in the group-level discount rates are reduced when we exclude 
overweight and obese subjects (BMI $ 25) from the estimation samples. Chabris et al. (2008) 
estimate  discount  rates  at  the  individual  level  and  show  statistically  significant  relationships 
between the estimated discount rates and behavioral variables such as BMI and smoking. 
4 Response time is a very noisy variable. An example of an outlier is a 59-second response in the 
Weight study (compared to a mean of 3.4 and SD of 2.8 seconds). In other analyses, varying the 
cutoff point from 2% yielded similar results to those reported here. 
5 These estimates are nearly identical to those in Table 1.  (averaged by trial) against  , and the corresponding regression 
lines.  When  we  average  by  trial  and  control  for  the  learning  effect, 
accounts for 51.2%, 49.8%, and 61.3% of the variance, respectively, in 
the Weight, Cognition, and Web studies. When we estimate a different  for 
each of the different reward categories, the results are even more statistically 
significant—the corresponding  values are 74.8%, 64.1%, and 70.8%. 
 
4.3. Using response times to predict preferences 
  We also invert the relationships reported in the previous subsection: 
we use response time data to estimate  . Specifically, we estimate equation (5) 
by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (6). Table 2 reports   and  for 
each of the three datasets, with the choice data columns showing estimates 
obtained by estimating the choice data model (2) and the RT data columns 
showing estimates obtained by estimating the RT model (5). The correlation 
between  the  ’s  estimated  from  choice  data  and  the  ’s  estimated  from 
response  time  data  is  0.97.
6 T h i s  d o e s  n o t  i m p l y  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  e s t i m a t e  
discounting  parameters  from  RT  data.  Rather  it  implies  that  there  is  an 
underlying structural relationship between revealed preferences and RT data. 
  Additionally,  we  estimate   a n d   for  each  of  the  three  reward 
categories.  We  estimate  the  choice  model  separately  for  each  reward  size 
category. The response time model (5) now includes a distinct discount rate, 
 , and precision parameter,  , for each of the three size categories. Table 3 
shows the estimates of   and  for each of the three size categories in each of 
the studies. Again, the estimates based on choice data covary closely with the 
estimates based on response times. The correlation between the  ’s estimated 
from choice data and the  ’s estimated from response time data is 0.82.
7  
In  an  earlier  version  of  this  paper  (Chabris  et  al.,  2008b),  we  also 
compare the predictive power of the discounting parameters estimated from 
choice data and the discounting parameters estimated (exclusively) from RT 
data.  The  discounting  parameters e s t i m a t e d  u s i n g  R T  d a t a  p r e d i c t  o u t -of-
sample choices almost as well as the parameters estimated using choice data.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Optimization theory predicts that agents will allocate more decision time to 
choices between options of similar expected utility than to choices between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  The   e s t i m a t e s  d o  n o t  m o v e  t o g e t h e r  due  to a  d i s c r e p a n cy  in  the  Weight  study.  The 
correlation between the ’s estimated from choice data and from response time data is –0.66.!
%!The correlation between the &' estimated from choice data and from RT data is 0.94.!options of dissimilar expected utility (Gabaix and Laibson, 2005; Gabaix et al., 
2006).  Our  experiments  confirm  this  prediction.  The  value-gap  variable 
explains 54% of the variance in average decision time across 27 binary choices. 
These  results  support  the  view  that  decision-making  is  a  cognitively  costly 
activity that allocates time according to cost-benefit principles.  
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 Table 1: Discount rates estimated using choice data 
   Weight  Cognition   Web  
0.0090  0.0060  0.0050  Alpha  
[0.0005]  [0.0003]  [0.0001] 
0.0248  0.0143  0.0104  Alpha small  
[0.0021]  [0.0011]  [0.0005] 
0.0129  0.0063  0.0056  Alpha medium  
[0.0010]  [0.0005]  [0.0002] 
0.0065  0.0045  0.0037  Alpha large  
[0.0006]  [0.0003]  [0.0001] 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 2: Estimated discounting parameters 
  Weight  Cognition  Web 
  Choice  RT  Choice  RT  Choice  RT 
Alpha  0.0094  0.0112  0.0060  0.0043  0.0050  0.0051 
  [0.0005]  [0.0013]  [0.0003]  [0.0003]  [0.0001]  [0.0003] 
Omega  0.0837  0.1545  0.1111  0.0845  0.1199  0.12457 
  [0.0028]  [0.0339]  [0.0039]  [0.0158]  [0.0024]  [0.0121] 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the RT model, observations are 
clustered by subject and robust standard errors are reported. 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated discounting parameters for each reward category 
  Weight  Cognition  Web 
  Choice  RT  Choice  RT  Choice  RT 
0.0207  0.0116  0.0147  0.0089  0.0106  0.0065  Alpha 
small  [0.0018]  [0.0017]  [0.0012]  [0.0012]  [0.0005]  [0.0006] 
0.0102  0.0106  0.0061  0.0042  0.0057  0.0066  Alpha 
medium  [0.0009]  [0.0020]  [0.0005]  [0.0006]  [0.0002]  [0.0006] 
0.0061  0.0073  0.0043  0.0040  0.0035  0.0055  Alpha 
large  [0.0006]  [0.0013]  [0.0004]  [0.0005]  [0.0002]  [0.0005] 
0.1509  0.0945  0.1917  0.1345  0.1898  0.1144  Omega 
small  [0.0079]  [0.0368]  [0.0106]  [0.0262]  [0.0059]  [0.0176] 
0.0804  0.0435  0.1125  0.0773  0.1195  0.0547  Omega 
medium  [0.0046]  [0.0156]  [0.0066]  [0.0152]  [0.0040]  [0.0082] 
0.0699  0.0395  0.0892  0.0682  0.0979  0.0471  Omega 
large  [0.0038]  [0.0154]  [0.0053]  [0.0140]  [0.0034]  [0.0076] 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. For the RT model, observations are 
clustered by subject and robust standard errors are report()$!
Figure 1: Plots of  versus  for each of the three studies 
!
!